

# Zero-Error Communication over Networks

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*Abstract* — We introduce the *ambiguity* of a channel, which characterizes the possibility in principle of a zero-error channel to simulate any other zero-error channel. We show how to calculate the ambiguity of a virtual channel connecting two arbitrary players in a network of potential malicious players.

## I. INTRODUCTION

In [2] Shannon proposed the *zero-error capacity*, which defines the asymptotically maximal rate at which bits can be transmitted over a noisy channel without *any* error. Elias showed in [1] that channels with a zero-error capacity equal to 0 can still transmit information without any error, in the following sense: He introduced the *zero-error list-of- $L$  capacity*—with and without feedback—, which defines the asymptotically maximal rate at which bits can be transmitted over a channel without any error, if the decoder is allowed to output a list of  $L$  strings, where one of them must be the string transmitted by the sender.

## II. ZERO-ERROR CHANNELS

We use a definition of channels without probabilities: A  $(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y})$ -zero-error channel is a relation  $\mathcal{W} \subseteq \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y}$ , where  $\mathcal{X}$  is the input domain,  $\mathcal{Y}$  the output range and  $\mathcal{W}$  the set of all possible input/output pairs. For every input symbol, there must exist at least one output symbol. A channel  $\mathcal{W}_1$  is *achievable* by a channel  $\mathcal{W}_0$  if there exists a protocol using  $\mathcal{W}_0$  as communication primitive that can simulate  $\mathcal{W}_1$ .

A  $(a)$ -List-channel is a  $(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y})$ -zero-error channel, with  $(a)$ -List =  $\{(x, y) \in \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y} \mid x \in y\}$ , where  $\mathcal{X} = \{1, \dots, a + 1\}$  and  $\mathcal{Y} = \{y \subset \mathcal{X} \mid |y| = a\}$ .  $(\infty)$ -List denotes the trivial List-channel over which no communication is possible.

Theorem 1 states that every zero-error channel is equivalent to a  $(a)$ -List channel.

**Theorem 1.** *For every zero-error channel  $\mathcal{W}$  there exists exactly one  $a \in \mathbb{N} \cup \{\infty\}$  such that  $\mathcal{W}$  achieves  $(a)$ -List and  $(a)$ -List achieves  $\mathcal{W}$ . This value  $a$  is called the ambiguity of  $\mathcal{W}$ , denoted by  $A(\mathcal{W})$ .*

Theorem 1 can be proven using the results of [1].  $A(\mathcal{W})$  is equal to the smallest value  $L$  for which the zero-error list-of- $L$  capacity of  $\mathcal{W}$  is non-zero. Corollary 1 shows that  $A(\mathcal{W})$  characterizes the possibility of a zero-error channel  $\mathcal{W}$  to simulate other zero-error channels.

**Corollary 1.** *For all  $\mathcal{W}_1$  and  $\mathcal{W}_2$ ,  $\mathcal{W}_1$  achieves  $\mathcal{W}_2$ , if and only if  $A(\mathcal{W}_1) \leq A(\mathcal{W}_2)$ .*

While improving the efficiency of zero-error communication, feedback does not change the ambiguity of a channel, and therefore does not improve the ability of a zero-error channel to simulate other zero-error channels.

## III. NETWORKS OF ZERO-ERROR CHANNELS

In a network of players connected by zero-error channels, a message can either be sent directly from the sender to the receiver, or indirectly through other players. The ambiguity of a virtual channel resulting from a serial concatenation of channels is the product of their ambiguities. We call such a virtual channel *malicious* if it has at least one intermediate malicious player—a player that does not follow the protocol.

The communication between two arbitrary players in the network is equivalent to a parallel concatenation of all virtual channels build by serial concatenation of all channels on a path from the sender to the receiver.

We will call the set of channels which are not malicious the *honest set*. As the receiver may not know which channels belong to the honest set, we only assume that he knows that the honest set is an element of an honest set structure  $\mathcal{H}$ —the set of all possible honest sets.

Theorem 2 shows how the ambiguity of a parallel concatenation of channels with a given honest set structure can be calculated. Using the transformation above, it can be used to calculate the ambiguity of a virtual channel between two players in any network of potential malicious players connected by channels.

**Theorem 2.** *Let  $W = \{\mathcal{W}_1, \dots, \mathcal{W}_n\}$  be a set of channels and  $\mathcal{H} = \{h_1, \dots, h_k\}$  a set of honest sets. Let  $\mathcal{W}_p$  be the parallel concatenation of the channels in  $W$  with the honest set structure  $\mathcal{H}$ . Let  $S_j = \{i \mid j \in h_i\}$  be the set of indices of all honest sets wherein player  $j$  is. The ambiguity of  $\mathcal{W}_p$  is the maximum of the sum of some integers  $a_1, \dots, a_k$ ,*

$$A(\mathcal{W}_p) = \max_{a_1, \dots, a_k} \sum_{i=1}^k a_i$$

such that for all  $j \in \{1, \dots, n\}$

$$\sum_{i \in S_j} a_i \leq A(\mathcal{W}_j) \quad (1)$$

holds.

If we have a threshold honest set structure—if up to  $t$  channels are malicious—, then the ambiguity of the parallel concatenation can be calculated more easily. The method is given in the full version of the paper.

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## REFERENCES

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